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1.  Introduction 
The vulnerability of energy supply infrastructure to climate change is an important topic in 
the literature on the adaptation to climate change, since all (economic) activity requires the 
input of energy.1 Consequently, this infrastructure (generation as well as distribution) is 
critical for the functioning of economies, and adaptation of the energy systems to climate 
change – in turn – is crucial for their maintenance. 
In the recent past, recurring disruptions of energy supply induced by extreme weather 
events have been observed.2 An obvious connection between weather extremes and energy 
supply is found in the hydropower sector. Hydroelectric power is the major source of 
electricity for 26 countries from the Sahel to southern Africa, and the secondary source for an 
additional 13 countries (Showers, 2002: 639). Due to drought, several areas in these countries 
from a wide range of climates were negatively affected by power shortages in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
The effect of extreme weather patterns, which are supposed to occur more frequently in 
future due to ongoing climate change,3 on energy supply systems is also observable from the 
Brazilian blackout in 2009. Some 40% of the Brazilian National Interconnected System’s load 
was interrupted in the course of an automatic disconnection of a transmission line as a 
consequence of adverse weather patterns (Ordacgi Filho, 2010). Furthermore, in 2005 
Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf of Mexico caused a gross peak oil supply loss of 1.5 mb/d 
(IEA, 2007: 37). Due to shortages in oil supply, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
even relaxed pollution standards nationwide, so that lower grades of gasoline were allowed 
to be used. This gasoline was expected to be imported from Europe (Mouawad et al., 2005).  
Extreme weather patterns can also negatively affect the power generation in fossil fuel and 
nuclear power plants (see e.g. Koch & Vögele, 2009; Kopytko & Perkins, 2011; Mideksa & 
Kallbekken, 2010; Flörke et al., 2011). Such plants require water for cooling processes; about 
43% of the EU’s water demand is used as cooling water by power authorities (EUREAU, 
2009: 21). The availability of cooling water is sharply reduced during heat waves and 
droughts. As Förster & Lilliestam (2010) show, power generation could be severely 
constrained by typical climate impacts such as increasing river temperatures and decreasing 
                                                      
1 “From a thermodynamic point of view, energy and matter are the fundamental factors of production. 
Every process of production is, at root, a transformation of these factors” (Baumgärtner et al., 2001: 
366). 
2 “The relevance of adding extreme events to the analysis is almost trivial: our serious worry about 
climate change is entirely based upon their possible occurrence” (van den Bergh, 2004: 392). 
3  Itteilag (2008) states that peak electricity demand in the US, typically for summertime air 
conditioning, is growing at 2.6% per year and he discusses available energy technologies and 
programmatic procedures to reduce electricity peaks and to prevent a peak electricity shortfall. 2 |  RÜBBELKE & VÖGELE 
 
stream flow. According to the IPCC (2008), the frequency of periods characterized by water 
shortages and by high water temperatures will increase in Europe and other parts of the 
world in future. Although all thermal power plants are negatively affected by high ambient 
temperatures, nuclear power plants are especially vulnerable (Linnerud et al., 2011: 150).4 
Yet, the problem of cooling water shortage is not only to be expected in future, since such 
shortcomings have already occurred in the past. During recent years, the rivers that supply 
the water used to cool many of Europe’s nuclear plants warmed up so often during summer 
heat waves that plant managers had to cut back power output and/or to release damagingly 
hot water back into the rivers. A severe heat wave in 2003, for example, which raised 
summer temperatures by 3 to 5˚C in most of southern and central European countries and 
which was accompanied by significant annual precipitation deficits (IPCC, 2008: 845), 
impaired the generation of electricity in more than 30 nuclear power plant units in Europe 
because of resulting limitations in the possibilities to discharge cooling water (IAEA, 2004). 
Some nuclear power plants got exemptions from legal requirements to be able to continue 
their operating activities. As a result of the cooling problems of the nuclear power plants in 
2003, France as the biggest electricity exporter had to import electricity from Great Britain to 
be able to supply enough electricity to Italy and other countries (UCTE, 2004). In 2006, a 
nuclear power plant in Spain had to shut down due to rising temperatures in the river 
supplying the plant’s cooling water and in France the government approved requests to 
allow plants to discharge cooling water at above normal temperatures. Also in 2009 a 
summer heat wave caused cooling water shortages in France. As a consequence the French 
nuclear power generation level dropped significantly. France had – as in the heat wave in 
2003 – to import electricity from the UK during the 2009-summer. Altogether a third of the 
nuclear power stations of the biggest European electricity exporter France was put out of 
action (Pagnamenta, 2009). Some German nuclear power plants had to reduce their 
electricity generation due to a summer heat wave in 2010. In order to protect the stability of 
the power grid, a concept for preventing the breakdown of the power supply and for 
limiting negative impacts on the environment was elaborated.  
Currently nuclear power has a share of about 28% in the electricity supply of the EU, while 
the respective share of hydro power is about 12% (EUROSTAT, 2010). So disruptions in the 
use of both nuclear and hydro-power plants may have significant impacts on the electricity 
supply system. In our analysis of the potential impacts of ongoing climate change on power 
supply in Europe, we will focus on these two important subsectors of energy generation. As 
the aforementioned negative climate-induced impacts on power supply imply, the 
adaptation to these impacts took place autonomously via the European electricity market 
(for different types of adaptation, see e.g. Fankhauser, Smith & Tol, 1999). International trade 
of electricity made it possible that the loss of power-generation capacity in one subsector or 
plant location of the European energy system was replaced by an increase in generation 
capacity in another sector/location, e.g. a decline in French nuclear power generation was 
compensated for by a rise in British supply of electricity. Yet, due to ongoing climate change, 
such autonomous adaptation might not be sufficient anymore in the future and advance 
strategic policy intervention might be required to reduce vulnerabilities of the European 
energy system. Yet, as Seo (2011: 825) stresses, “[a]daptation measures that should be 
publicly coordinated for the provision have not received a proper attention up until now.” 
Due to the long lifetime of infrastructures and the magnitude of investments in the electricity 
                                                      
4 Greis et al. (2009) investigate a specific conventional steam/gas power plant site in Germany and 
find that rising average air and water temperature levels will cause only very small changes in gross 
power output until 2050. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE POWER SECTOR | 3 
 
sector, especially in this sector, public adaptation strategies should be developed at an early 
stage.
5  
In order to demonstrate the potential necessity for public adaptation strategies in the 
European electricity sector, we conduct an analysis of the autonomous short-term adaptation 
of this sector, i.e. we investigate short-term and temporary changes in power generation and 
national import-export balances for electricity induced by extreme climatic conditions. Yet 
beyond, we analyse distributional impacts of such autonomous adaptation, i.e. we also 
regard redistribution of consumer and producer rents in order to identify the main losers 
and potential beneficiaries of climate change-induced energy insecurity. Potentially 
undesired redistribution of wealth, either between consumers and producers or between 
individual countries, can be identified and public adaptation strategies to prevent such 
adverse developments can be launched in advance.  
In detail we proceed as follows. In section 2, we discuss different aspects of energy security 
that will be relevant for our subsequent analysis of the consequences of future power supply 
disruptions and explain, from an ex-post perspective (see Löschel et al., 2010 for a discussion 
of ex-post and ex-ante perspectives on energy security), how disruptions in energy supply 
might affect rents of agents acting on the markets for energy. In section 3, we present the 
methodology of and the scenarios regarded in our analysis. In section 4, the results 
concerning electricity generation, trade and distributional effects are displayed and 
discussed. Section 5 puts these results in a broader context and draws some conclusions. 
2.  Climate Change and Energy Security  
According to the IEA (2007: 12), energy insecurity “stems from the welfare impact of either 
the physical unavailability of energy, or prices that are not competitive or overly volatile.” 
Conveying this idea inversely, Bohi & Toman (1996: 1) state that “[e]nergy security refers to 
the loss of economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change in the price or availability 
of energy.” In general, the change in availability of energy influences the price of energy via 
market interaction and vice versa, i.e. price and availability changes are interrelated. Via the 
price mechanism demand (supply) for energy is equalized to the supply (demand), except 
for extraordinary and rare cases where energy is indeed physically unavailable (e.g. due to 
embargos or wars). If we therefore focus on the normal cases, energy (in-)security is mostly 
an issue of price changes and not of complete unavailability of energy. As Helm (2002: 176) 
points out: “The complementarity of energy with the rest of the economy means that 
customers will typically want stable and predictable prices, in line with their investments in 
durables, housing and capital stock at a point in time”.6 Expressed in welfare terms, which is 
of major importance in both definitions of energy (in-)security above, consumers of energy 
perceive energy insecurity because they suffer welfare losses which might be either due to 1) 
higher total energy expenses caused by rising energy prices, 2) sharp rises in energy prices 
(volatility) or, in some rare cases, 3) the unavailability of energy supply.  
The consequences of energy (in-)security on the utility levels of energy suppliers is more 
complex. Let us consider the change in their rents from an ex-post perspective and by 
                                                      
5 See, e.g. Guthrie (2006) for the influence of public regulations on investment behaviour in the 
electricity sector. 
6 According to the findings of choice experiments conducted by Longo et al. (2008), consumers are 
willing to pay a higher price for electricity in order to internalize the external costs of energy 
insecurity. 4 |  RÜBBELKE & VÖGELE 
 
focusing on price level aspects (ignoring the influence of price volatility itself on welfare) in 
the simplified illustration of Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Change in rents and market equilibrium induced by a shock on the supply side 
 
We assume that there is a temporary loss in energy supply by the amount L caused, e.g. by 
extreme-event-related problems in the generation process. Let us temporarily suppose that 
there are linear energy demand and supply functions for the regarded economy. Initially, i.e. 
before there is this supply side shock, the initial supply curve (thin line fading to the short 
bold line intersecting the axis of ordinates) and the demand curve intersect in A. The loss in 
energy supply by L (see the associated marginal prices in this supply range) causes a 
modification of the supply curve. Since the cheapest supply options still prevail (left hand 
side of the lost supply range), the new supply curve coincides with the old one in the 
respective supply range. Beyond this low-cost range, the new supply curve is located above 
the old one; it is depicted by the bold line passing through the new market equilibrium B.  
The decline in consumer-rent, due to higher market prices for energy and the cutback in 
energy consumption, is depicted by the (light, medium and dark) grey shaded area. The 
medium and dark grey areas reflect the loss in consumer rents caused by the increase in the 
market price for energy. The light grey area stands for the loss resulting from the shrinking 
of the level of consumed energy. 
In contrast the suppliers obtain additional rents due to the increase in the market price for 
energy and these additional rents are depicted by the dark grey shaded area. The medium-
grey triangle also depicts additional revenues due to higher energy prices, but these are 
immediately sapped by higher supply cost: the loss L in supply has to be partly replaced by 
alternative supply at higher cost. This loss due to higher supply cost is depicted by the area 
between the new and the initial supply curve up to the new quantity (associated with B) of 
energy sold on the market. Finally, below the light grey shaded triangle, there is a striped 
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area, which depicts supplier rent losses due to the decline in energy sold on the market. The 
overall change of supplier rents depends on the slope of the supply function.   
Let us next have a closer look at the distribution of supplier rents and how they might 
become affected by energy supply disruptions causing energy insecurity to rise. We now 
assume that, before the shock, energy had been supplied by three companies. An individual 
energy providing company i (i=1,2,3) had initially a supply Si (see Figure 2). Let us 
furthermore assume that only the supply of the second company collapses, while the other 
two companies’ supply remains unchanged (it is neither reduced nor can it be augmented; 
their marginal supply cost will neither change). Let us further assume that, due to the loss in 
the second company’s supply, a fourth company will enter the market and will supply 
additional energy, but at higher marginal costs than the other companies on the market.  
As we can observe from Figure 2, the first and third company will obtain a gain in their rents 
by the dark grey areas RG1 and RG3, respectively. RG1 and RG3 are equal to the rise in the 
market price (pB-pA) multiplied by supplied quantities S1 and S3, respectively.  
Figure 2. Changes in individual suppliers’ rents 
 
 
The entrant to the market, i.e. the fourth company, will now supply the amount L-R=S2-R, i.e. 
it will sell an amount of energy that is equal to the difference between the second supplier’s 
former supply S2=L minus the reduction R in total sales on the market. Of course, by entering 
the market the entrant gains additional rents (grided area RG4) which he could not 
materialize in the initial situation when competitor 2, who could supply energy at a lower 
price before, was still on the market. Consequently, the only energy supplier suffering from 
the loss of low-cost energy supply capacity is supplier 2, whose own supply and rents cease 
to exist. Supplier 2’s loss in rents is equal to the dotted area RL2 in Figure 2. The other 
suppliers take advantage at the expense of the consumers who have to pay a higher energy 
price. The sum of total supplier rents and total consumer rents declines after the break-down 
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of company 2’s supply, since supply cost of energy have been increased and energy sales 
shrank.  
In contrast to this case, there may be situations without real impairments of energy supply 
but where rumours about crises or shortages are spread in order to induce a price increase 
on the energy markets while supply cost remain actually unaffected. Then suppliers’ profits 
tend to be augmented (as long as price-elasticities of demand are moderate), while the 
consumers will lose consumer rents. Consequently, the suppliers acquire additional rents at 
the expense of the consumers, while total rents (sum of supplier and consumer rents) decline 
as the consumption of energy shrinks due to rising market prices.  
A national government might try to reduce vulnerability of its economy with respect to 
international energy supply disruptions (e.g. stop in the delivery of gas via international 
pipelines for political reasons) by supporting domestic energy supply. This could be done by 
raising the price of imported energy via a tax which will encourage domestic supply and 
mitigate dependency on foreign supply. “The difference between the domestic price and the 
expected price of imports reflects the risk premium - the greater this risk or the greater the 
risk aversion, the greater will be this premium” (Markandya & Pemberton, 2010: 1611). Of 
course, such policies would also affect consumer rents as well as domestic and foreign 
energy suppliers’ profits in different ways. 
From this discussion we can observe that the consumers of energy always suffer from 
energy-insecurity related price effects, while individual suppliers might take advantage of 
partial shortages or even from rumours about shortages in the short-run. Therefore, from the 
consumers’ point of view energy security with respect to certain forms of energy like oil 
might even be considered as a global or international public good.7 From an economic 
perspective it is irrelevant where a country’s consumers acquire their oil which is due to its 
fungibility. As Crane et al. (2009: 14) point out, “[d]isruptions of supplies or jumps in 
demand anywhere in the world will be distributed across the world market.” Yet, with 
respect to electricity supply interrelations between regional shortages, price effects and 
redistribution of rents are different from those related to oil supply, amongst other things 
because electricity is not traded in global but in regional networks, i.e. there is a limited 
fungibility of electricity.   
Since energy is used in every process within an economy, energy prices will cause the prices 
of all commodities and services to increase. “Price shocks may prevent the economy from 
performing to its full potential, the reason being that the sudden change of relative prices of 
production input factors may lead to temporarily increased unemployment or the 
obsolescence of production capital” (Löschel et al., 2010: 1666). Possible macroeconomic 
effects of energy price shocks are discussed, e.g. by Bohi & Toman (1993), and they may 
negatively affect both consumers and suppliers of energy.  
After this rather general description of changes in consumer and producer rents caused by 
supply side shocks, we more specifically consider rent redistributions in Europe, which are 
caused by electricity shocks exerted by climate change-related extreme weather events, in the 
subsequent sections.    
                                                      
7 Egenhofer (2007) discusses the EU’s ’trilemma’ in the shape of potentially conflicting objectives for 
energy security, market liberalization and environmental protection. He points out that the “concern 
about security of supply in liberalized markets is connected to viewing security as a public good or 
externality” (Egenhofer, 2007: 88).   3.  M
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In order to assess the impacts of climate change on nuclear power plants in Europe we use 
an approach introduced by Koch & Vögele (2009) (see also Rübbelke & Vögele, 2011). Like in 
other thermal power plants, in nuclear power plants only a part of the energy input is 
converted to electricity. The rest of the energy is transformed to heat. That part of heat which 
is not used for district heating has to be disposed either to the air or by using cooling water. 
As shown in Koch & Vögele (2009) and Rübbelke & Vögele (2011), the demand for 
freshwater of a thermal power plant can be assessed by  
() ()
EZ
AS c
h KW
Q
elec
total
F ⋅
⋅ ⋅
⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
−
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
ϑ
ω β α
η
η
1 1
1
6 . 3
           ( 1 )  
where  QF:   cooling water demand [m3] 
  KW:    installed capacity [kW] 
  h:    operation hours [hours] 
  3.6    factor to convert kWh to megajoules 
  ηtotal:   total efficiency [%] 
  ηelec:    electric efficiency [%] 
  ￿:   share of waste heat not discharged by cooling water [%] 
  ￿:   share of waste heat released into air [%]  
  ￿￿:   correction factor accounting for the effects of changes in air temperature 
and humidity within a year [–]   
  ￿:   water density [t/m3] 
  c:   specific heat capacity of water [MJ/t K]. 
  AS:   permissible temperature increase of the cooling water [K] 
  EZ:    densiﬁcation factor [–]  
Equation (1) describes the links between use of fuels, energy conversion, production of waste 
heat and demand for cooling water. Based on information on the electricity produced in a 
period (KW.h) and data on efficiencies, the amount of total waste heat can be calculated. In 
Equation (1) the amount of waste heat that has to be removed by using cooling water results 
from total waste heat (KW.h. 3.6.(1-ηtotal)/ηelec) multiplied by different correction factors 
accounting for, e.g., the share of waste heat released into the air. The first part of the 
denominator in Equation (1) describes how much energy is absorbed if one m3 of water is 
heated up by one degree centigrade and the second part (AS) of the denominator depicts the 
degrees centigrade the water is heated. The return water results from waste heat divided by 
the heating up potential of the water which is calculated by multiplying heat capacity and 
permissible temperature increase. For the calculation of the freshwater demand it has to be 
taken into account that, if a cooling tower is used, additional water will be necessary to avoid 
an increase in salinity caused by water evaporation. By using EZ as densiﬁcation factor we 
take this aspect into account. 
If no cooling tower is used, the waste heat will be released into the receiving surface water. 
Using a cooling tower, the waste heat will be released mainly into the air. In the latter case, 
the demand for cooling water results from losses of water evaporated in the cooling tower. 
The amount of evaporated water depends on air temperature and humidity as well as on the DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE POWER SECTOR | 9 
 
freshwater which is needed to prevent the build-up of minerals and sediments in the cooling 
cycle.  
The impacts of cooling water shortages and limitations on the increase in water temperature 
can be assessed by transforming equation (1) to  
() EZ h
AS c Q
KW
elec
total
F
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
−
⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
ϖ β α λ
η
η
ϑ
) 1 ( 1
1
6 . 3
  (2) 
Assuming limitations in the available amount of cooling water (
F Qmax) and a lower 
permissible temperature increase of the cooling water  (ASmax), the capacity has to be 
reduced to  
() EZ h
AS c Q
KW
elec
total
F
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
−
⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
=
ϖ β α λ
η
η
ϑ
) 1 ( 1
1
6 . 3
max max
max
 
(3) 
where   KWmax:   usable capacity [kW] 
For the scenarios we consider, information on installed power plant capacities, electricity 
exchange capacities, cost figures and the demand for electricity at a given point in time are 
needed. For the analysis of the impacts of climate change on the electricity supply also 
changes in air and water temperature as well as the availability of water have to be specified. 
In our study we use figures provided by the Union of the Electricity Industry 
(EURELECTRIC, 2009) for the description of the power plant stock in 2030. Information on 
the electricity exchange capacities and on load figures is extracted from a publication of the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E, 2011). In 
addition, we use data of the IAEA (2008) to assess the possibilities to postpone inspections 
and maintenance periods of nuclear power plants to periods in the summer when plants’ 
cooling systems tend to be at high risk. The employed climate change scenario corresponds 
to a projection of the Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling and Analysis (CCCMA) for the 
“A1” emission storyline of the IPCC. The projection is provided with a spatial resolution of a 
square kilometer which makes it possible to extract power plant site specific data 
(Govindasamy et al., 2003; WORLDCLIM, 2010); see Figure 4 for respective air temperature 
data and projections for Europe.  
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(see Mohseni et al., 1998; Webb et al., 2003; Morrill et al., 2005; Pedersen & Sand-Jensen, 2007 
and WWF, 2009).  
The parameters for the air/water temperature relationship are derived from the literature 
(Morrill et al., 2005 and WWF, 2009): The minimum stream temperature is assessed to be 0°C, 
the maximum stream temperature 29°C, the steepest slope 0.14 and the air temperature at 
the inflection point 16.5°C. For each power plant site, specific data on air temperature is 
extracted from the climate model. The data are inserted in equation (4) in order to calculate 
the power plant site specific water temperatures.  
Due to a lack of data and in order to limit the complexity of our study, we assume that all 
nuclear power plants have the same efficiency. In addition, we assume a densification factor 
of 3 for all power plants with closed-circuit cooling system. These assumptions have been 
chosen in accordance with DOE/NETL (2007) and World Nuclear Association (2010).  
The ‘Reference’ scenario describes the situation without climate change and the scenario 
‘Climate Change/Slight Water Scarcity’ refers to the situation with changes in air and water 
temperature. In accordance with Umweltbundesamt (2008), we assumed for this scenario a 
reduction in runoff of rivers of up to 10%. The impacts on the electricity supply of a more 
serious water scarcity are analyzed in the third scenario (“Climate Change/More Serious 
Water Scarcity”). Here we assumed a reduction runoff of rivers of up to 25%. 
With an optimization approach implemented in GAMS, we assess the cost-optimal use of the 
existing power plants for each country in Europe taking electricity import and export 
capacities into account. Based on electricity prices calculated for each country and 
information on the variable costs of the different power plants (including fuel costs), 
country-specific producer surpluses are identified. The producer surpluses are used as 
indicators identifying those countries where the electricity suppliers will benefit or suffer 
from climate change. 
4.  Results  
In our calculations, in the “Climate Change/Slight Water Scarcity” scenario during the peak 
load time in summer, the available capacity of nuclear power plants will be reduced by 6 GW 
and the available capacity of hydro-power plants by 12 GW due to the assumed increases in 
air and water temperature and decreases in water availability. In the scenario “Climate 
Change/More Serious Water Scarcity”, the capacity that is unavailable will rise in total by 
another 19 GW.  
Climate change will have impacts not only on the production levels but also on the electricity 
prices. Gas and coal power plants will be used to compensate supply gaps. Because the 
production cost of these power plants are higher than the ones of nuclear and hydro-power 
plants, electricity prices will increase. In the “Climate Change/Slight Water Scarcity” 
scenario, the prices for electricity increase in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. The price effects in this scenario are relatively 
small. The changes in prices are significantly higher in the climate change scenario with 
higher water scarcity. In this scenario, the electricity prices in Switzerland, for example, rise 
by 80% because expensive gas-fired power plants would be put into operation. In the 
reference scenario, only ‘cheap’ hydro and nuclear-power plants were employed in this 
country. With the need to raise the use of gas-fired power plants, also in other European 
countries the electricity prices are expected to increase significantly (Figure 5).  
In both climate change scenarios, the use of domestic power plants is extended in countries 
like Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain. In other countries domestic electricity 12 |  RÜBBELKE & VÖGELE 
 
production decreases because of limitations in the use of nuclear and hydro-power plants 
caused by limitations in their availability and the induced increases in domestic electricity 
generation costs. These countries will tend to augment their imports of electricity or reduce 
their exports. 
Figure 5. Changes in electricity prices and generation 
Changes in prices 
 
Changes in production 
 
 
Examples for the potential impacts of climate change on suppliers’ rents are presented in 
Figure 6. This figure shows the electricity supply of Switzerland and Germany with and 
without climate change. In the reference scenario, power plants with an overall capacity of 16 
GW are in use in Switzerland and with an overall capacity of 72 GW in Germany. Assuming 
that electricity prices correspond to the marginal generation cost at that deployed power 
plant which exhibits the highest marginal cost, the electricity prices will reach €25/MWh in 
Switzerland and €53/MWh in Germany. In the “Climate Change/More Serious Water 
Scarcity” scenario, less hydro and nuclear power plants will be available. Therefore, the 
merit order curves (reflecting supply curves as those used in simplified ways in Figures 1 
and 2) move to the left and consequently the electricity prices increase. The increase in the prices in
well as 
German
domesti
Figure 6
 
Figure 7
hand, th
the redu
supplier
Figure 7
Remarks:
Figure 8
our scen
change.
DIST
nduces a lo
 France, bec
ny will imp
ic power pl
6. Electricity 
S
7 shows the
he increase 
uction in d
rs’ rents in 
7. Changes in
Sw
: Green: incre
8 gives an 
nario the el
. In contras
RIBUTIONAL C
ower deman
cause other
ort less elec
lants. 
 production i
Switzerland
e changes in
 in prices c
domestic su
Switzerland
n the supplie
witzerland 
eases in supp
overview o
lectricity su
t, the suppl
CONSEQUENC
nd of other 
r countries 
ctricity from
in Switzerlan
d 
n the suppl
causes an au
pply dimin
d will increa
rs’ rents of S
pliers’ rents; 
of the suppl
uppliers in 
liers’ rents 
CES OF CLIMAT
 countries f
can supply
m France an
nd and Germ
 
liers’ rents i
ugmentatio
nishes supp
ase by 190%
Switzerland a
 
 orange: decr
liers’ rents 
Germany w
of e.g. Aus
TE CHANGE IM
for electricit
y additiona
nd Switzerla
many (2030) 
in Switzerla
on of suppli
pliers’ rents
% and the re
and German
reases in sup
in the indiv
will belong 
strian, Britis
MPACTS ON TH
ty produced
l electricity
and and wi
 
Germ
and and Ge
iers’ rents. O
. All in all 
ents in Germ
ny 
German
ppliers’ rents
vidual Euro
 to the bene
sh and Span
HE POWER SE
 
d in Switze
y in a cheap
ill extend th
many 
ermany. On
On the othe
 the change
many by 9%
ny 
. 
opean coun
eficiaries of
nish suppli
ECTOR | 13 
erland as 
per way. 
he use of 
n the one 
er hand, 
es in the 
%.  
 
ntries. In 
f climate 
iers, will 
 14 |  RÜB
decreas
electrici
climate 
slight w
the elec
Figure 8
5.  C
Nuclear
combat 
the nuc
power p
drought
Consequ
sources 
ongoing
Autono
inducin
location
to asce
supplier
extreme
We foun
e.g. in A
patterns
but pric
than 80
the degr
While E
some Eu
and nu
warmin
scenario
BBELKE & VÖG
e due to ch
ity exports.
 change-rela
water scarcit
tricity price
8. Impacts of 
Conclusion
r energy is 
 global war
lear power 
plants are li
t and heat
uently, wh
 – which w
g climate ch
omous adap
ng a tempor
ns. In order 
ertain induc
rs and cons
e weather p
nd that stro
Austria, Fra
s as well as 
ces tend to r
% and in F
ree of globa
European co
uropean su
uclear powe
ng, as can b
o implies a
GELE 
hanges in t
 In Switzer
ated water 
ty, because 
e will remai
f climate chan
ns 
 frequently
rming (see e
 sector is ne
ikely to be i
t waves. S
ile represen
were in the 
hange.  
ptation in th
rary realloc
 to assess cl
ced rent r
sumers, we
patterns (he
ong decline
ance and Sw
 in import a
rise signific
rance by m
al warming,
onsumers w
uppliers mig
er. The ch
be easily ob
a decline in
the electric
rland the ch
 scarcity. Th
 in this scen
in almost on
nge on suppl
y regarded 
e.g. Apergis
egatively af
impaired by
uch incide
nting option
focus of ou
he energy se
cation of po
limate chan
redistributio
e considered
eat waves a
es in electric
witzerland. B
and export b
cantly in so
more than 30
, the real eff
will through
ght gain fro
ange in su
bserved from
n respectiv
ity supply 
hange in su
hey only de
nario the Sw
n the level o
iers’ rents 
as a vehicl
s et al., 2010
ffected by c
y climate ch
nces also i
ns for clim
ur analysis 
ector takes p
ower gener
nge impacts 
ons both b
d temporar
and drough
city generat
By means o
balances, lo
me Europe
0% in one o
fects might 
hout lose w
om the clim
uppliers’ re
m the Swiss
ve rents, w
curve and 
uppliers’ re
ecline in the
wiss produc
of the refere
le to reduc
0). Yet, there
climate chan
hange-relate
interfere  w
mate change
– at the sam
place via in
ration amon
 on power s
between po
y autonom
ht) for differ
tion due to 
of changes i
ocal electrici
an countrie
of our scena
 be even str
welfare due 
mate-change 
ents depend
s case, whe
while strong
 a decline 
ents depend
e climate ch
ction will b
ence scenari
ce CO2 emi
e is also a re
nge, since c
ed extreme w
with hydro-
 mitigation
me time req
nternational
ng differen
supply patt
ower supp
mous adapta
rent climate
 climate cha
in European
ity shortage
es, e.g. in Sw
arios. Howe
ronger. 
to the rise i
 induced di
ds on the 
ere a moder
ger  global 
 
in the capa
ds on the e
hange scena
be reduced 
io. 
issions and 
everse inter
cooling proc
weather ev
-power  gen
n, these two
quire adapt
l electricity 
t sectors an
terns in Eur
liers and b
ation in resp
e change sc
ange tend t
n power ge
es can be ov
witzerland b
ever, depen
in electricity
isruptions o
severity  o
rate climate
warming  t
acity for 
extent of 
ario with 
whereas 
 
 thus to 
rrelation: 
cesses of 
ents like 
neration. 
o energy 
tation to 
 markets 
nd plant 
rope and 
between 
ponse to 
cenarios. 
to occur, 
neration 
vercome, 
by more 
nding on 
y prices, 
of hydro 
of  global 
e change 
tends to DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE POWER SECTOR | 15 
 
augment these rents. The latter is due to the fact that electricity prices will increase much 
more in the case of strong global warming and the Swiss suppliers can therefore usurp 
additional rents at the expense of the consumers of electricity. 
Hence, besides the possibility that solely autonomous adaptation via reallocation of power 
generation might become insufficient to prevent power supply disruptions caused by 
ongoing climate change and rising severity of associated extreme events in future, there is a 
second reason for also executing advance strategic public policy intervention concerning 
adaptation (which complements autonomous adaptation) in the electricity sector: the short-
term, temporary reallocation of power generation might cause an undesired redistribution of 
wealth. 
Such strategic public policy intervention concerning adaptation could either target the 
affected power sector itself or it may (also) address the upstream water supply sector. In the 
latter case, an improvement of the management of water supply is an option. Yet, many 
European river basins supplying cooling water are transnational and therefore an 
international coordination is required in many cases. Improvements in the power sector itself 
could be attained, e.g. by increasing power plant efficiencies. These measures (improvement 
in the management of water supply and augmentation of power plant efficiencies) tend to 
have positive consequences for the hydro and nuclear-power supply and consequently may 
help to prevent both power supply disruptions as well as potentially undesired welfare 
redistributions (which could be perceived to arise e.g. if large rents are redistributed from 
consumers to individual suppliers whose supply cost have not or only slightly increased).   
Another option to prevent power supply disruptions is the diversification of the sources of 
supply. The augmentation of the use of such power plants that do not require cooling 
systems (e.g. photovoltaic installations) could contribute to the mitigation of adverse effects 
of climate change on the electricity supply system. However, the option of raising the use of 
expensive photovoltaic installations does not prevent those undesired rent redistributions 
between consumers and producers we discussed in this paper. However, it might affect the 
redistribution of suppliers’ rents among nations.  
Furthermore, in order to mitigate unfairness perception ex post, those rents which 
governmental decision-makers consider to be unfairly usurped by the suppliers at the 
expense of consumers could be (partly) taxed away and the revenues could be employed for 
public measures mitigating global warming or helping to adapt to it. In this manner, 
beneficiaries of (higher electricity prices induced by) climate change could take their share in 
financing climate policies.  
Yet, such a tax scheme should be designed with care, because it may adversely as well as 
positively affect suppliers’ incentive structures. On the one hand, it should not yield 
disincentives for suppliers to provide sufficient power reserve capacities. The price is an 
indicator for scarcity and a high price provides incentives for raising investments in the 
supply infrastructure. On the other hand, a tax levied on rents acquired only due to 
temporary climate change effects provides disincentives for suppliers to usurp additional 
rents by manipulating prices via strategically reducing power supply in summer peak-load 
periods. 
Although we did not discuss the potential impact of the design of network infrastructures on 
rent distribution, the related effects might be significant and seem to provide some scope for 
future research. 
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